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Abstract 
 
The contemporary turn of events post-Brexit and the election of Donald Trump hints 
at a return of protectionism. However, for years now, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has been advocating and continues to advocate that regional arrangements 
and closer economic integration would benefit all countries. Arguments regarding 
trade integration clearly have been contentious. Nonetheless, in regards to small 
island countries (SICs), it is quite evident that they perform better together than 
alone. The route to regionalism has been a long and painful journey for both the 
Caribbean Basin and the Pacific Rim. Many simply dismiss the sluggish growth of 
the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) in comparison with the Caribbean Island Nations 
(CINs) by simply declaring that regionalism is working better for the latter. This 
study presents a detailed account of efforts at nurturing regionalism on the part of 
these two seemingly similar, yet distinguishable groups of islands. Through such 
scrutiny, this paper documents a stark contrast in the development of trade 
arrangements that clearly influence the growth of the regions. 
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Introduction 
 
Trade liberalization has come about only through long and painful discussions both 
for the Caribbean Basin and for the Pacific Rim. An interesting observation made by 
several authors is that “both in the Caribbean and in Oceania, regional states have 
had a significant history of cooperating in an attempt to lessen the inherent and linked 
problems derived from their size and their islandness” (Rolfe, 2007, p. 100). From 
the theoretical perspective of economic integration, the smallness of an economy 
forces production to be of sub-optimal size, causing economic disadvantage 
(Armstrong et al., 1998). These authors assert that the significance of trade to smaller 
economies necessitates economic integration, in hopes of benefiting from access to 
other/larger markets.  
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) for years has advocated that regional 
arrangements and closer economic integration can benefit countries by improving 
scale. Simultaneously, it acknowledged that under certain circumstances regional 
trading arrangements could also be an obstruction as they could invite rampant trade 
diversions (Freund & Ornelas, 2010). Arguments regarding trade integration clearly 
have been contentious. However, as regards Small Island Countries (SICs), in the 
Third Summit of the Alliance of Small Island States it was emphasized that it makes 
sense for small and less developed states to group together to take advantage of the 
“unlimited development opportunities to be achieved when pursued in partnership 
and with a sense of common purpose” (Alliances of Small Island States, 1999). 
  
Integration among small island economies has long been at the heart of discussions 
by developing countries facing challenges of globalization. The past two decades 
attest to renewed interests in integration by means of trade arrangements. In 2000, a 
total of 170 regional trade agreements had been notified to the WTO. This rose to 
330 agreements by July 2005. As of April 7, 2015, approximate 612 notifications of 
regional agreements had been received by the WTO (World Trade Organization, 
2015). Such regional trade agreements have become increasingly prevalent. The 
scope of agreements has evolved as well. For instance, initially, the emphases of 
trade agreements were on visible trade barriers, the likes of tariffs and quotas. 
However, recently these have been extended to invisible barriers such as health 
(sanitary) and environmental standards, government regulations, labeling 
requirements, and measurement standards, increasing the complexity of such 
arrangements. As globalization accelerates, changes in the international trade system 
are inevitable. The WTO in 1994, for instance, extended the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade from traded goods exclusively to include trade in services and 
intellectual property rights through the General Agreement on Trade and Services 
(GATS).  
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Viner in 1950 (as cited in Piquet, 1950) investigated the welfare-enhancing effect of 
economic integration and coined the terms trade creation and trade diversion. 
Simply put, trade creation is replacing higher-cost domestic production with lower-
cost imports from a partner country, whereas trade diversion is replacing lower-
costing cheaper imports from the world market with higher-costing imports from a 
partner. Thus, Balassa (1962) infers that the magnitude of the trade 
creation/diversion determines whether the economic integration process is welfare-
enhancing or not.  
 
Over the years, many countries have undertaken expansive steps. Newer countries 
have joined one or more such agreements and dormant agreements have been 
reviewed and revived. The World Bank evaluates one such preeminent example: the 
European Union, which originally was a Customs Union (Common Market to the 
European Community), later changed to a Single Market with free movement to 
labor, capital, and services and substantial regulatory harmonization and eventually 
to an Economic Union with a single currency (Fernandez & Portes, 1998, p. 197). 
As expounded by the aforementioned authors, economic integration unfolds in three 
stages. First, the trade is liberalized amongst partner countries. Next is the 
liberalization of the movement of factors of production; followed by integrational 
coordination of national policies, mostly involving exchange rates. The EU is just 
one of the best-known examples of regional trade agreements (Snorrason, 2012). 
More recently, the EU has been in the process of negotiating a new free trade 
agreement with the United States, known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) together in an economic partnership with Japan. In the likely 
event that the United Kingdom decides to become an independent player post-Brexit, 
it will definitely have much less bargaining power than it had whilst being part of the 
EU.  
 
Additionally, according to the WTO (2015), here are a few of the best-known 
examples of regional trade agreements: The European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), The Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR), The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA), and The Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA). The WTO states that the above arrangements worked 
well for the member countries because mostly regional trade agreements supplement 
multilateral trading systems. However, in the wake of the 2016 US presidential 
election, previous arrangements on the trade forefront have been challenged. 
President Trump has been saliently engaged in renegotiating NAFTA; has withdrawn 
from the Trans Pacific Partnership; and has placed a hold on the TTIP with the EU. 
Hence, whilst recognizing the possibility of regional trading arrangements failing 
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under certain circumstances, the WTO emphasizes trade integration as 
complementary to development. In WTO’s analysis of Globalizing Regionalism, it 
is indicated that economic integration can particularly help small developing 
countries build on their comparative advantage, sharpen the efficiency of their 
industries, and strengthen their political commitment to an open economy (Moore, 
2000). 
 
Narrowing the focus to small island nations the likes of those in the Pacific and 
Caribbean regions, one finds commonality in their smallness, remoteness, 
institutional weakness, restraining infrastructure and production homogeneity. A 
region with economies that are small and isolated from integrated economic hubs is 
really constrained to derive benefit from economies of scale and domestic 
competition and, hence, likely to experience relatively higher costs of production and 
to lack competitive edge. Nonetheless, the combination of regional integration and 
opening of small economies has been seen as a catalyst for growth. High dependency 
on other economies, heavy reliance on importations and lack of local capacities have 
hampered development in these regions. It is believed that engaging in intra-regional 
trade as such would build up local export markets and provide confidence to smaller 
island economies to compete on a larger scale. Moreover, in addition to the 
traditional benefit of trade creation, regional integration acts as a platform for 
incorporation in the world economy and is particularly significant for enhancing 
effectiveness of small economies. 
 
Comparative Analysis of the Caribbean and the Pacific – A Historical 
Account 
 
Apart from commonality of issues in regional integration such as smallness, 
remoteness, poor governance, and so on, the literature draws a parallel between the 
two regions based on other compelling resemblances, such as the similar historical 
patterns that the Caribbean countries and the Pacific Island countries have 
established over the years on their respective journeys towards regionalism. These 
similarities, of course, accompanied by subtle dissimilarities, are the topic of 
discussion in the following sub-sections.  
 
Colonial Legacy 
 
A German historian, Richard Konetzke, traces the footing of the Caribbean region 
dating back to when Columbus set sail in Santa Maria to build a settlement on the 
north coast of Espanola (known today as Santo Domingo and Haiti). The scant 
background demonstrates that the Antillean islands (a common alternative name for 
the Caribbean region) were Europe’s first economic stepping-stone outside itself. 
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One may not wish to reduce this to mere harbors of entry, trade destinations, or ports 
of call; in fact, they were Europe’s very first overseas colonies. On the other hand, 
while Britain was initially hesitant to annex the scattered South Pacific Island group, 
growing German imperialism prompted the emergence of British influence. New 
Guinea was annexed by Germany and Papua got annexed by Britain. The two halves 
of the island came together under Australian rule under the auspices of the League 
of Nations post–World War I. Samoa and Micronesia were added to the list of 
Britain’s existing annexations (Fiji and the Solomon Islands). 
 
This British heritage made integrating considerably easier than it might otherwise 
have been within the Pacific and Caribbean regions. However, the literature shows 
that the level of integration differed. Differences, of course, are a matter of influence 
too when it comes to regional cooperation. The first such is the spread between the 
regional island states in the Pacific, whereas distances between the Caribbean isles 
are shorter. In addition, although the Caribbean is a part of the United States’ 
immediate region due to its proximity, the US has not played a constructive role in 
the region. The giants Australia and New Zealand, in contrast, have actively 
participated in the regional development process for the Pacific Islands. 
Both regions have also experienced their fair share of friction caused by the 
superpower nations of the world. Post–Cold War, the Caribbean Basin saw strife 
between the old colonial powers of Europe and the United States. Whilst Great 
Britain was pulling its hands away from the region, the US was subtly increasing its 
influence. Swelling US interest was also due to the (historic) threat once posed by 
the Soviet Union over missiles deployed in Cuba. History has named the events of 
October 1962 as the ‘Caribbean Crisis’. As for the Pacific countries, though 
dependence upon colonial administrators is self-explanatory, the Pacific micro-states 
also attracted interest from outside powers with no former colonial history. Such 
overtures had been expressed by the former Soviet Union, China, and Japan through 
diplomatic ties, trade links, and aid and assistance. The North Pacific countries have 
their eyes set on the vast fisheries of the Pacific Island countries. 
 
The next group of states that view the Pacific as a strategic ground are the United 
States and France. To them, the region is ideal for nuclear testing, mining operations, 
and military and communication bases. None of these groups wish to see their 
influence in the Pacific region dilute and as such clashes and conflicts are 
unavoidable. 
 
Era of Enslavement 
 
In the 15th century, the then newly colonized settlements required labor in large 
quantities. Within the Caribbean, “before-slavery laborers were: indentured servants, 
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convicts, whore, petty thieves, labor organizers , the pariahs of Britain and France, 
as well as countless native Americans from the inlands themselves and from the 
mainland; after-slavery there were: contract laborers from India, China, Java, Africa, 
the Iberian Peninsula and elsewhere” (Mintz, 1974, p. 46). The waves of migration 
in the Caribbean Region has made it an epitome of as much ethnic, racial, linguistic, 
and physical heterogeneity as can be discovered in any other region of comparable 
size in the rest of the world. Noteworthy is also the fact that this transition in the 
context of that time was always massive: 
 
More than half a million Indians, both Moslem and Hindu, were shipped to the 
Caribbean region, most going to Trinidad and Guyana (erstwhile British 
Guiana), with smaller numbers to Dutch Guiana, Jamaica and Martinique; about 
150,000 Chinese were imported, principally to Cuba; more than 30,000 
Javanese, entirely to Surinam (Dutch Guiana); even a few Indo-Chinese ended 
up in the cane fields. Whatever their biases in other regards, the European 
planters of the Antilles were apparently quite free of prejudices when it came to 
brute labor—even fellow Europeans would do. Spaniards and Portuguese, in 
particular, reached the Caribbean colonies in large numbers in the nineteenth 
century, proving that Europeans too could cut cane beneath a broiling tropical 
sun. (Mintz, 1974, p. 47) 
 
During the same period in the Pacific region, the colonies’ tropical production of 
copra, sugar, vanilla, cocoa, and other products had become valuable commodities. 
The European trading companies in charge of controlling these commodities also 
owned the plantations on which these were cultivated as well as the avenues of 
shipping and retailing. As such, the late nineteenth century saw a significant 
immigration of Indian indentured laborers to work on the sugar plantations. The 
British colonial administrators defended the native land-tenure system which 
sustained the traditional life of the colonies, for example, the customary chief 
practices of Fiji and the royalty-based system in Tonga.  
 
Post-independence, the nine states of the South Pacific (Western Samoa, Nauru, Fiji, 
Tonga, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu (formerly known as the 
Ellice Islands), Kiribati (formerly known as the Gilbert Islands), and Vanuatu 
(formerly known as New Hebrides) got divided into three broad cultural areas: 
Polynesian (center and east), Melanesian (west), and Micronesian (northwest). 
Evidently, there is significant cultural heterogeneity within each of these sub-regions 
(Fry, 1981, p. 456). 
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Dependence on the Metropolitans 
 
The Caribbean region of perhaps fifty insular societies scattered over more than two 
thousand square miles of the sea, as well as certain mainland sub-regions, is 
described by Mintz (1974, p. 46) as just as utterly differentiated as it is complex. The 
writer goes on to add that the Caribbean is the most richly researched region yet the 
most poorly understood as well. Many researchers have their unfavorable views as 
regards the Caribbean’s condition. Alonso (1994, p. 582) judges the Caribbean Basin 
to be at a crossroads since the early 1970s, when indigenous demography were 
experimented with, by fiat, to replace local populations with outsiders. In the face of 
political autonomy, even local elites could not save their economies from dependence 
on the metropolises and the United States. Mintz (1974, p. 45) agrees that 
dependence had become a habit for the Caribbean. Just consider how long they were 
dependent on empire for law, language, institutions, culture, even officials.  
 
History has likewise witnessed an inevitable dependence on the part of the South 
Pacific micro-states on a handful of metropolitan countries Australia, New Zealand, 
France, Britain, and the United States, along with the European Community, Japan, 
and the Soviet Union/ Russian Federation. Before 1965, Pacific Islanders had little 
say regarding decisions concerning the region. The power predominantly lay in the 
hands of nations having territorial interests—Britain, France, the Netherlands, the 
United States, Australia, and New Zealand. These combined to form the South 
Pacific Commission (SPC) in 1947. SPC, now known as the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community, was established to “encourage and strengthen international cooperation 
in promoting the economic and social welfare and advancement of the peoples of the 
non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific region” (Haas, 1989, p.32). 
Initially, during the formation of SPC, there were several rebellious efforts from 
nearly all Island Representatives, led by Sir Ratu Mara of Fiji, which resulted in the 
adoption of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 1974 that granted the Island 
delegates fair authority in regional affairs.  
 
The Concern for Sovereignty  
 
The beginning years of Caribbean integration were filled with struggle. While on one 
the hand there was a range of non-traditional security issues such as drug smuggling, 
on the other hand there was a rise in health pandemics. Already burdened with 
concern on sluggish integration, the member states were alleged of placing national 
interests ahead of regional and to be lacking in functional cooperation (CARICOM, 
2005).There were questions of trading off sovereignty for higher trade exchange as 
well as the overpowering of the market by the bigger players. Dating back to 1965, 
the very first Heads of Government Summit was held to discuss the advancement of 
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regional community. As a result, the CARIFTA (Caribbean Free Trade Association) 
was formed. CARIFTA was primarily formed to boost economic activity by 
removing tariffs on imports and quotas on goods produced within the Caribbean trade 
bloc. Troubles arose when it was realized that many of the partner Caribbean islands 
generated revenue from imposed trade tariffs and had become reluctant to remove 
these barriers. Later, discussions on CARICOM (Caribbean Community and 
Common Market) arose when smaller and poorer states of the Eastern Caribbean had 
complained that CARIFTA’s existence benefitted the ‘big four’ countries of 
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad-Tobago (Corkran, 1976, p. 65). It was 
cited from the Guyana Chronicle, 2005 where the President of Guyana stated, “it is 
not an easy task to sell CARICOM to Guyanese as an integrated community with 
benefits to be derived when they are treated better outside of CARICOM than at 
regional ports of entry.” Although the issue of ‘sovereignty’ was conflicted, it was 
unanimously agreed that CARICOM was not merely a regional integration platform 
but depended principally on shared cultural identity. The current befitting workhorse 
of Caribbean integration, CARICOM had to tackle the sensitive issue of sovereignty 
before any real regional economic planning could be undertaken. 
 
In the South Pacific, conflicts of interest arose when the Pacific micro-states set on 
promoting and engaging in regional projects demanding enormous levels of resource 
commitment and substantial integration. A question of forgoing sovereignty arose 
when, to the disappointment of other Pacific Islands, many regional institutions got 
based in Fiji, e.g., USP (the University of the South Pacific), SPEC (the South Pacific 
Bureau for Economic Cooperation), the SPC Community Education Centre, the 
Telecommunications Training Centre, and Air Pacific. This stirred up tensions 
between Fiji and other island nations, which triggered a fight for power amongst the 
countries. Further rigidity set in, once there was metropolitan inclusiveness in 
regional affairs, for instance, the United States’ involvement in the regional fisheries 
agencies. The regional cooperation turned into a political skirmish for power among 
the Pacific Island Countries, mainly including Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Western 
Samoa. 
 
Presence of Regional Organizations 
 
Although it appears that economic integration has not been optimally realized yet in 
either region, many regional organizations have been orchestrated to assist the efforts 
of further economic cooperation. These organizations enhance regionalism in the 
arenas of education, government administration, resource management, disaster 
rehabilitation, justice, and law and order. Against the backdrop of distant routes, 
developing economies, and slim markets; without the strong presence of such 
regional bodies the island-states would become immaterial; they would lose their 
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voice and their standing internationally. It is evident that the regional leaders are 
aware of the gravity of the situation. The table below is a compilation of regional 
organizations in the Caribbean and the Pacific that have been stepping stones towards 
regional trade integration. 
 
Route to Regionalism 
 
Never before has there been a greater need for these two regions to face the 
challenges posed by globalization head-on. The changes in WTO rules and decisions 
demand austere actions. For instance, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Article XIII1, led to the removal of the preferential trade arrangements that affected 
the banana industry and sugar industry in both the Caribbean and the Pacific. 
Furthermore, WTO’s mandate to reduce worldwide tariffs has worsened the 
competitiveness of the regional industries. The Caribbean and the Pacific, alike, have 
not always been able to keep abreast of technological advancements and evolving 
international trading patterns. It is not surprising, then, that promoting regionalism is 
no longer just a preference but rather a necessity. The following section discusses 
the journey of the two regions towards regionalism, in chronological order.  
 
The Caribbean Basin 
 
As early as 1958, the Caribbean began its evolution of regionalism with the 
establishment of the British West Indies Federation, in order for the small island 
economies to survive decolonization. The Federation was a political unit formed with 
the aim of regaining independence from Britain as a single Caribbean state. The 
Federation came to an end in 1962, without having achieved much due to an internal 
conflict of sovereignty. However, what the Federation did plant was an idea of odds 
through cooperative and centralized processes. The next three years saw the 
formation of a centralized regional cooperation in the management of the University 
of the West Indies which was later followed by developments in the regional 
shipping services, the Caribbean Meteorological Service (Rolfe, 2007, p. 101). 
 
The Regional Heads of Government held their first summit in 1965, to discuss the 
concept of a regional community and as an outcome the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA) was developed. The Commonwealth Caribbean Regional 
Secretariat was established in 1968 and the Caribbean Development Bank in 1969. 
Both were designed after the formation of CARIFTA to enhance the benefits to the 
region economically and developmentally through expansion and diversification of 
regional trade.  
 
                                                     
1 GATT Article XIII: importation of any product must be applied consistently to all WTO Members. 
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Table 1. Selected Caribbean Regional Organizations and their Memberships 
Organization 
 
Membership 
Association of Caribbean 
States (ACS) 
- was formed with the 
objective of improving 
transportation, enhancing 
trade, facilitating 
sustainable tourism, and 
having effective and 
coordinated response to 
local natural disasters in 
member countries. 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts &Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and 
Venezuela. 
Caribbean Court of 
Justice 
-is the judicial body for 
the Caribbean 
Community 
(CARICOM). 
Antigua &Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & 
Tobago  
University of the West 
Indies 
-was formed with aim of 
developing economic and 
cultural growth in the 
Caribbean. 
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks and 
Caicos Islands.  
Global System of Trade 
Preferences among Developing 
Countries (GSTP) 
-is a preferential trade 
agreement, signed (1988) 
with the aim of 
facilitating trade between 
developing member 
countries.  
Algeria; Argentina; Bangladesh; Benin; Pluri-
national State of Bolivia; Brazil; Cameroon; Chile; 
Colombia; Cuba; Ecuador; Egypt; Ghana; Guinea; 
Guyana; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea; Republic of Korea; 
Libya; Malaysia; Mexico; Morocco; Mozambique; 
Myanmar; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; 
Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Sudan; 
Tanzania; Thailand; the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia; Trinidad &Tobago; Tunisia; 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; Viet Nam; 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Sources: Table information from Rolfe, 2007, p. 102; memberships from WTO 
website; objectives of the organizations from individual websites. 
 
 
The Journal of Pacific Studies, Volume 38 Issue 1, 2018 109 
 
By 1971 all the region’s (British) Commonwealth Island states and territories had 
joined CARIFTA in an effort to liberalize trade in manufactured goods and provide 
for managed trade in agriculture goods; it also contained special arrangements for 
the smaller countries of the Eastern Caribbean (Bannock, Baxter, & Davis, 
2011,p.11). The difference of course between CARIFTA and the earlier agreement 
was that the former sought to attain political integration while the latter was focused 
on economic cooperation. CARIFTA was supposed to remove trade barriers, to 
benefit all members equally. This was believed to have transformed into a common 
market and customs union (Corkran, 1976, p. 52). CARIFTA was successful to the 
extent that exports proliferated, but along with that came wealth disparities within 
the region (Rolfe, 2007, p. 105). Corkran (1976) found cases of complaints, by 
smaller countries in the Eastern Caribbean that CARIFTA was biased towards 
benefitting larger countries like Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago. 
Hence, CARIFTA had been compromised and seemed not to meet the full 
expectations of the Heads of the Government.  
 
In 1973, CARIFTA was transformed into a new community called Caribbean 
Community and Common Market (CARICOM). CARICOM had three broad pillars: 
“economic integration (a common market); functional cooperation (education, health 
and several other areas)[;] and foreign policy coordination” (CARICOM, 1973, 
Article 4). The Association of Caribbean States (ACS, 1994) was also designed 
during the same period, with the intention of promoting trade, sustainable 
tourism, the environment, transport and natural disasters (ACS 2005). Serbin 
(1994), Phillips (2002) and Girvan (2006) agree that ACS lacked cohesion and 
complete agreement by its members. Economic integration meant free movement 
of goods, services, capital, and people. The second pillar was to combine members’ 
limited resources in areas like education, health, environment, science and 
technology, communications, meteorology, response to natural disasters (Warner & 
Anatol, 2015, p. 188), ultimately to foster the region’s external position through 
coordinating member states’ foreign policies. It was later noticed that CARICOM 
was not comprehensive enough and that it failed to address the stated objectives 
under the aforementioned separate pillars. 
 
Therefore, partially as a result of and partially unconnected with CARICOM’s 
development, seven Eastern Caribbean states formed the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) in 1981. This replacement organization was established 
through the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas with the immediate membership 
of the region’s four independent states; Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad & 
Tobago (Rolfe, 2007, p. 101) (see Table 1). The OECS was formed with the objective 
of protecting sovereignty. Eight of the nine members of OECS (Anguilla, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Montserrat, and St. 
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Vincent and the Grenadines) share a common currency managed by the Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank (Warner & Anatol, 2015, p. 188), and the Central Bank is 
in charge of maintaining financial integrity and transparency for these OECS states. 
Today the OECS has objectives to promote cooperation, to harmonize foreign policy, 
and to advance economic integration (OECS, 2005b). It is believed that OECS was 
successful in solving issues that CARICOM could not; for instance, starting in 2011, 
OECS ensured that all people from the sub-region would be able to move and work 
freely in other member states. The formation of OECS has also had positive 
outcomes in terms of levels of aid and technical and financial assistance (Lewis, 
2003, p. 333).  
 
During 1989, the Single Market and Economy was created. The common market had 
been replaced by the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), designed to 
be more responsive in the era of globalization. The CARICOM Single Market was 
officially inaugurated in 2006 and the Single Economy is scheduled for completion 
in 2015 (Bannock et al., 2011, p. 12). The reforms under CSME included free 
mobility of certain classes of people as well as movement of goods, services, and 
capital, through measures such as removal of all barriers to intra-regional trade and 
harmonizing standards so as to increase acceptability of goods and services being 
traded. It involved the formation of a monetary union, implementation of the 
Common External Tariff, and adoption of a common incentives programme (Rolfe, 
2007, p. 106). CSME also ensured the right to establish CARICOM businesses in 
any Member State without restrictions and made provision for sharing collected 
customs revenue and external goods importation (Bannock et al., 2011, p. 19). 
  
All in all, in the Caribbean, CARIFTA was the starting point of regionalism. This 
Caribbean Free Trade Agreement was active from 1968 to 1973. It stimulated 
regional exports of light manufactured goods; however most advantages skewed 
towards larger countries in the region. While convinced by the effectiveness of 
economic integration, the countries replaced CARIFTA with another agreement: 
CARICOM. The Caribbean Community Common Market reigned for almost three 
decades (1973–2006). It was a customs union with expanded scope to not only cover 
merchandise trade but also to facilitate provision of services, capital, and labor. The 
CARICOM council supported foreign policy harmonization as well as functional 
collaboration of education and health affairs. Post-2006 to date, the CSME has been 
driving social and economic integration in the region by forming a trade bloc. The 
CSME, along with the other features of CARICOM, added elements of currency 
union and functional cooperation on macroeconomic policy, sectoral policy, and 
external trade policy harmonization.  
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The Pacific Way 
 
‘The Pacific Way’ terminology was coined by Fiji’s former statesman, Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara to describe the Pacific region’s ceremonial and lionized form of 
negotiations, discussions and dialogue. A revisit into the history of the South Pacific 
confirms the overgrowing interests of many metropolitan countries, the likes of 
Britain, France, the Netherlands, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. As 
a result of which, in 1947, the South Pacific Commission was inaugurated to 
coordinate social and economic development of the dependent countries in the region 
(Haas, 1989). The leaders of the Pacific Island Countries demanded equal authority 
in deciding for the region and hence a memorandum of understanding was signed in 
1974.   
 
In order to accentuate indigenous control, another regional organization was 
established in 1965—the Pacific Island Producers’ Association (PIPA). This 
organization was initiated by Fiji and later joined in by Western Samoa, the Cook 
Islands, Niue, Tonga, and the Gilbert (Kiribati) and Ellice Islands (Tuvalu). Initially, 
the aim of PIPA was to supplement closer cooperation amongst Pacific islands 
supplying bananas to the New Zealand market. However, at a later stage, this 
expanded to include shipping, marketing, and research as well (Fry, 1981). Many 
authors believe that a country’s sheer economic weight gives it a voice and a role; 
following this notion Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV, then Prime Minister of Western 
Samoa, asserted, at the 1971 PIPA Conference, “This is the strength by islanders, 
and created by islanders, and successful only from the efforts of such” (Fry, 1981, p. 
463). This Polynesian assertion concluded in 1973 only after the formation of another 
organization with a broader role. 
 
In the early 1970s, the Pacific leaders realized the need for a platform to promote 
political cooperation, one in which Pacific challenges could be addressed with one 
voice. In 1971, Fiji, Western Samoa, and the Cook Islands initiated the South Pacific 
Forum (SPF) (renamed to Pacific Islands Forum in 2000), because of many 
restrictions under SPC. Other island nations joined eventually, along with Australia 
and New Zealand. The discussions were widespread; however, much attention was 
given to discussions of French nuclear testing, decolonization, shipping, civil 
aviation, telecommunications, trade promotion, bulk purchasing, and the control of 
fishing resources (Fry, 1981, p. 464). In 1972, the South Pacific Bureau for Economic 
Cooperation (SPEC) became SPF’s center for research and development. SPEC had 
been instrumental in coordinating negotiations with the European Community—
promoting trade, examining feasibility of a regional shipping line, and contemplating 
matters of telecommunications and fisheries (SPEC, 1980).  
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The South Pacific Forum faced a major impediment, as it required considerable 
commitment in terms of natural resources as well as a compromise of national 
sovereignty. It was difficult at this point to prove how much regionalism had been 
practiced, as the negotiations put in place generally epitomized a lesser degree of 
integration. Fry (1981) cited examples of negotiation by individual countries for 
preferential access to external markets like the European Union, Australia, and New 
Zealand. This was contrary to the function of SPF in encouraging regional 
integration. 
 
The South Pacific Forum then established three sub-regional groupings in the late 
1980s. Alongside the South Pacific Forum, other Oceanic Regional Organizations 
were designed to provide a clearer mandate for specific activities. The first group, 
known as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), was formed in 1987 between 
Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, and later joined by Fiji in 
1996. It mediated trade disputes between members, advocated the development of a 
regional military security force, and considered the merits of a sub-regional air 
services agreement (Rolfe, 2007, p. 113). The second grouping constitutes smaller 
island states such as the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, and 
Tuvalu. This group discusses policies for such countries regarding regional transport 
infrastructure, climate change, and development funding (Rolfe, 2007). The third 
grouping, known as the Micronesian ‘compact states’ (Marshall Islands, Federates 
States of Micronesia and Palau), were part of the Free Association with the United 
States. The member countries of Compacts of Free Association (CFA) receive 
financial support and controlled access to education and health. In addition, these 
states get duty-free, non-reciprocal exports to the US to a certain degree. Surprisingly 
enough, these three groups of small islands work separately to pursue their interests 
and do so while keeping the wider interests of the Forum in prospect. 
 
Even so, attempts to develop a regional airline and a regional shipping line have been 
less than successful in the past. The need for a proper transport infrastructure in the 
Pacific has already been acknowledged; however, in a region of small, widely 
separated, economically weak Island states, private operators would only operate if 
they could make a profit (Rolfe, 2007, p. 116). This difficulty in a region of small 
numbers and vast distances called for public sector cooperation.  
 
An illustration of such government cooperation can be seen in the area of regional 
security. The peacekeeping operation in Bougainville (Rolfe, 2001) and stability 
operations in Solomon Islands (Kabutaulaka, 2005) are remarkable examples of 
‘Pacific solutions for Pacific problems’. Other regional achievements have been the 
development of a regional nuclear-free zone in 1985 and the 1991 improvement on 
a regional fishing regime, which banned driftnet fishing (carried out by other 
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nations).  
 
Moreover, in 1981 came about the development of the South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), which received “duty free 
and unrestricted access on a non-reciprocal basis to the Australian and New Zealand 
markets” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1996, p. 25). Some authors 
criticized SPARTECA as a platform to foster further dependency (Schultz, 2012); 
however, in several Asia Development Bank (ADB) reports a few positive impacts 
had been also noted. Australia’s and New Zealand’s slow but growing openness to 
other countries was a clear signal for the Pacific Islands to opt for a different 
approach towards economic liberalization. 
 
The Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) and Pacific Agreement on 
Closer Economic Relations (PACER) come into picture to provide “a basis for 
increasing regional integration and as a means to effectively prepare members’ 
economies to respond to globalization” (Pacific Islands Forum, 2001). Again, 
criticisms for these agreements are many. PICTA was signed in 2001 and came into 
force in 2003, but only became operational as of 2007 (Prasad, 2008, p. 91). It was 
designed to enhance trade between the 14 member countries by reducing tariff 
barriers to zero, allowing a period of protection for selected products in order to 
support infant industries. The reasons underlying this is the fact that the key obstacle 
to inter-island trade is not trade barriers, but rather is the voluminous transportation 
costs due to considerable distances between the islands themselves, low economies 
of scale, and a lack of diversity between the items of trade. Connell and Soutar (2007) 
starkly verify that there is simply little to exchange between the Pacific Island 
Countries, citing one instance from the past—the ‘kava-biscuit war’ of 2004–2005. 
This case study shows breach of regulations under PICTA and MSG when Fiji 
banned kava from Vanuatu and in exchange Vanuatu sought to protect its biscuit 
industry from the more developed Fijian industry. Neither Fiji nor Vanuatu could be 
penalized as their actions reflected the sensitivity of trade in the region, when both 
the states have very little to trade. If anything, PICTA had been provoking 
competition rather than cooperation between the island states.  
 
On one hand, amongst the region’s top four export destinations only Tuvalu traded 
with a PICTA partner (7% of its total exports with Fiji). On the other, from within 
the region only Tuvalu (45.8%), Kiribati (27.5%), Samoa (20.5%) Tonga (26%) and 
Cook Island (6%) imported from the (same) PICTA partner - Fiji. According to the 
study by the Institute of International Trade (IIT 2008) this confinement was due to 
two reasons: (i) Fiji’s impeccable location making it a transshipment hub and (ii) 
regional trade being higher for services (particularly communications and 
government services) than for goods. Consequently, to make PICTA truly a region-
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wide integration, inclusion of trade in services was inevitable. In 2004, PICTA got 
upgraded to PICTA Trade in Services (TIS) to cover 11 service sectors: business, 
communication, constructions, distribution, education, environmental, financial, 
health, tourism, recreational and transportation. PICTA TIS under negotiation 
currently are categorized in two broad areas: Trade in services for Sectoral 
Liberalization and Temporary Movement of Natural Persons. It was not until the 
deadline for the tariff- cuts in 2009 that the members of PICTA could utilize the 
provisions. Although at present no substantial progress has been made under the two 
categories, supporters affirm the future of PICs’ as optimistic. Henceforth the Pacific 
Islands Forum Leaders are working towards creating a single regional market 
through extension of PICTA to PICTA TIS. 
 
In the intervening time, Papua New Guinea and Fiji signed an interim Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2007 to maintain preferential access to Europe for 
processed tuna and raw sugar. While the rest of the Pacific Island Countries had little 
interest in European Union’s EPA, Fiji and Papua New Guinea would have had to 
face significant raise in tariff rates had they not cooperated. Controversial as it is, 
PICs argue that EU’s push for a new EPA is purely a strategy to access Pacific’s raw 
material before the Islanders strike a deal to trade these resources with their (EU’s) 
Asian rivals (PANG, 2008).  
 
Further, the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations is a framework of 
which PICTA is an arm of. Negotiations on PACER had started in 2001 however 
was not in force until 2011 (Prasad 2008, p.91). Unlike PICTA, PACER included the 
two giants – Australia and New Zealand. The PACER commits all members to begin 
negotiation towards a free trade agreement by 2011 at the latest. Qalo (2003) argues 
that one of the shortfalls of PACER is that there is a scope for the current trade 
imbalances to increases under free trade agreements mostly due to Australia and New 
Zealand being highly efficient producers.  
 
When Australia gains unprotected markets in the Pacific Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) they could displace local producers. Adding on, Scollay (2001) writes 
that the economic effects are likely to be very small, may be negative for some Forum 
Island Countries’. An extension of the PACER agreement currently being debated is 
the PACER Plus. 
 
The discussions regarding PACER Plus started when Australia and New Zealand 
(ANZ) brought to attention the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) obligation. Australia 
and New Zealand emphasized that PIC’s having negotiations with European Union 
for preferential market access under EPA had triggered the MFN clause. As a result, 
ANZ introduced PACER Plus for free trade arrangements. The motive of PACER 
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Plus is to prioritize on issues of trade facilitation, regional labor mobility, shipping, 
aviation, telecommunication and water infrastructure. Nevertheless, it is also 
acknowledged that the benefits of such agreements will only manifest given strong 
effective domestic reforms. Pacific Islands are yet to improve on supply-side 
constraints, regulatory and governance policies and institutional arrangements. 
Deliberations on PACER Plus are on-going ever since. Many have criticized saying 
that PACER Plus is only benefitting the economically powerful in the region – 
Australia and New Zealand. The argument has reached an extent where the two 
largest Pacific countries are on the verge of retreating. Papua New Guinea’s trade 
minister has declared PNG’s withdrawal from this agreement already while Fiji 
having withdrawn once is currently uncertain. PACER Plus’ cohorts believe that it 
will boost economic growth in the region but views of the PIC Heads differ.  
 
Reflections 
 
Purportedly, regionalism is working well for the Caribbean region (Warner 
&Anatol2015; Simms & Simms, 2007; Bennett 1999). However; the same cannot be 
claimed for the Pacific region. A closer look at the development of integrational 
arrangements within this paper brings to light subtle differences in the execution of 
these arrangements between the two regions. 
 
When compared with other discussed trade arrangements, the spectrum of the 
Caribbean Community and Common Market agreement makes it the most robust 
trade agreement. CARICOM was as a result of the plight from smaller island 
countries upon being marginalized by other larger countries in the Caribbean region. 
It was not only a response for fair trade but also the Revise Treaty (Revised Treaty 
of Chaguaramas, Chapter 4, Article 51) under CARICOM assisted in the growth of 
intra-regional firms by allowing freer flow of capital and labor. The Pacific region 
still faces restrictions in this forefront. In addition, as evident in many of the 
Caribbean arrangements, integration amongst the countries of the region is practiced 
at a very advanced level. For instance, in the formation of OECS, eight of the nine 
countries are unionized under a common currency which is administered by a central 
bank. It is the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank which has also harmonized the 
macroeconomic policies and foreign policies of the member states. Moreover, under 
CARICOM Single Market Economy (CSME) there have been developments to co-
ordinate national policies of Member States and the establishment and maintenance 
of an investment friendly environment (Warner & Anatol, 2015). Whilst the success 
of this protocol is not verifiable, a step toward pro-investment policy is definitely in 
the right direction.  
 
In terms of chronological order; efforts of regional integration in the Caribbean 
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region (be it economically, politically or functionally) substantiated approximately 
two decades prior to the negotiations in the Pacific. For the Caribbean, initial 
attempts of integrating regionally started with CARIFTA in the year 1965. One of 
the cited advantages of CARIFTA agreement was the increase in regional export in 
manufactured consumer products from Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (Bennett 
1999, p. 136). In contrast, the Pacific talks of regional integration had not started 
until 1981. Although SPARTECA had stirred discussions on regional trade, its 
progress was sluggish. Concurrently the Micronesian CFA and Melanesian MSG 
were established. During this long gestation in the 1980s, the Pacific Island member 
countries lacked political conviction. It was reasoned that this lack of commitment 
was based on substantial rivalry amongst the island nations due to the similarity in 
their production baskets. Such conflict was demonstrated when, after the 
implementation of the MSG; several factories in Vanuatu were forced to shut down 
because they were incapable of competing with the trade in fiberglass and tinned fish 
from other Pacific countries. By the same token, due to the increase in imported beer 
from the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu’s locally brewed beer has been run out of 
business. Likewise, many countries are unable to match the low cost of Fiji’s bottled 
water, thus these infant firms had to shut down. At this juncture, PICTA was 
negotiated in order to include Australia and New Zealand in the trade equation. 
Furthermore, trade in services were additional elements of inclusion under PICTA 
TIS and PACER Plus trade negotiation. Nevertheless, the argument overgrowing 
competition rather than cooperation within the Pacific region remains. 
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